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F OR the past several years the air transport industry has been the
subject of a great debate. For the most part, it has been a one-sided
debate with rather broad assertions and contentions being made before
Congress, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the public. These broad
assertions have sought to prove that there has been a concentration of
air traffic in the hands of a few "grandfather" carriers who, as a result
of that concentration, have enjoyed "excessive profits."
This article will demonstrate how wrong these contentions have
been. It will show, briefly, the reasons for the enactment of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938; the nature of air transport regulations; the
record of certificated air transportation under regulation of the Civil
Aeronautics Board; the contributions of certificated air transport to
national defense and the postal service; the prevailing extent of intense
competition in domestic and international air transportation; the fact
that there is neither concentration nor monopoly in certificated air
transport today and little prospect that it can be expected in the future;
and the fallacious reasoning behind any doctrine designed to substitute
unlimited right of entry for the prevailing and proven philosophy of
regulated and restricted competition under the Civil Aeronautics Act.
THE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS OF AIR TRANSPORTATION
Before discussing the record of certificated scheduled air transpor-
tation in detail, it would be well to look at the general nature of the
business. For, as one of the most-if not the most-precisely regulated
of all public service industries, scheduled air transport submits to cer-
tain restrictions and must discharge certain obligations.
The industry is regulated not only as to basic policy but, as will
appear shortly, as to the innumerable details of its daily business. And,
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in addition to its general obligation to be of public service, the industry
has specific obligations to the commerce, the postal system and the
national defense.
The regulations and the obligations both exist because Congress,
some 17 years ago, determined that a scheduled air transport system
must be created to meet a public need. The administration of the law
governing the development of the scheduled air transport industry was
entrusted to a federal agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board.
One of the general objectives set was that the industry must be of
general public usefulness. It is the task of the industry to provide a
universal air service-service not just for passengers, but for mail and
goods; service not just for the large cities, but for the country's smaller
communities. In brief, the duty of the industry is to develop air trans-
port. A second objective was that the industry must be competitive.
A third objective was that the industry must become strong and self-
sustaining.
How the objective of developing air transport has been served can
be told in the growth of traffic, the addition of schedules, the introduc-
tion of new equipment-the production of more and more service at
less and less cost to the public. How the objective of becoming more
competitive has been served is conveyed in many ways: in the story
of parallel services being established; in the vigor of the competition
as reflected, to some extent, in the lusty promotional campaigns and
the large volume of advertising sponsored by the industry. The drive
for self-sufficiency is reflected in the fact that subsidy is a smaller and
smaller proportion of industry revenues and, in recent years, has annu-
ally required a smaller appropriation, despite greatly increased service.
Two additional general observations may be made before going
into detail. One is that, in addition to actually being the world's most
competitive air transport system, if not the world's only competitive
system, the American-flag airlines compete with the great foreign-flag
systems. It is worth noting that this competition is no longer restricted
to the international routes. Under established government policies,
foreign-flag airlines are given traffic rights which compete, directly and
indirectly, with our domestic airlines. And, through special proce-
dures, the foreign-flag airlines may receive hearings and decision far
more rapidly than is possible for our own airlines.
The second general observation is that, although this country's
scheduled air transport has, as the figures show, discharged its obliga-
tion to be of service to the commerce, the postal system and the national
defense, as yet it has not fulfilled completely the promise it has held
out for its investors. The measure of the industry's increased usefulness
is to be found in gross traffic figures, in gross revenues. But the measure
of its strength for the future is found partly in its net income. And the
increase in net income has not been commensurate with the increase
in grosses.
REGULATED COMPETITION
THE BACKGROUND AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT OF 1938
At the outset, it should be made perfectly clear that the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938 was a carefully considered statute which was
designed to create a system of regulated competition for commercial
aviation. At the time of the passage of the Act, its sponsor in the
House, Representative Clarence F. Lea, pointed out that the Act was
necessary because "the industry has reached the point where unbridled
and unregulated competition is a public menace . . ."' It was not sur-
prising that the will of Congress changed the nature of the unrestricted
competition previously inherent in air transportation and statutorily
prohibited it for the future. Prior to and since the Act of 1938, other
public service enterprises had or have been placed under public regu-
lation, which meant that they were removed wholly or in part from the
workings of a free enterprise system and from the play of unrestricted
competition. This was not applicable only to those public utilities
which we know as natural monopolies. This same type of economic
control was applied to radio and television and, in the transportation
field, to our railroads, our truckers, our bus companies and our pipe-
lines as well as our airlines.
The purpose of this approach resulted from the understandable
conviction that, in many circumstances, unchecked and unrestrained
competition was harmful to the community. Certainly, the history of
air transportation before 1938 gave further validity to this contention.
When Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act, the financial situ-
ation of the air carriers had become so chaotic as to shake the faith of
the investing public in their financial stability and to prevent the flow
of funds into the industry. Fifty per cent of the $120,000,000 of private
capital that had been invested in the air transport system before 1938
had already been lost. Congress was aware of the history of "boom and
bust" which had made the railroad industry a chronically sick industry.
In 1938, when the Civil Aeronautics Act was passed, one-third of all
railway mileage was in the hands of receivers or trustees.
The Civil Aeronautics Act was enacted to provide unified regula-
tion of the air transportation industry in accordance with a compre-
hensive and long-range program based on sound economic principles.
Congress intended to prevent uneconomic and destructive competition
and wasteful duplication of services. The Senate Committee which
reported the bill which eventually became the Civil Aeronautics Act
put the matter succinctly:
"Competition among air carriers is being carried to an extreme,
which tends to jeopardize the financial status of the air carriers
and to jeopardize and render unsafe a transportation service appro-
priate to the needs of commerce and required in the public interest,
in the interests of the Postal Service, and of the national defense."' 2
'83 Congressional Record 6407, 6507 (1938).
2 Sen. Rep. No. 1661, 75th Congress, 3rd Session, p. 2.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Accordingly, any evaluation of commercial aviation today and of
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 must be against a background of
the purposes of the Act and the recognition that the Act enunciated a
doctrine of restricted competition. Whether that Act has been success-
ful, whether there is any validity to the contentions recently made by
a handful for limitless freedom of entry, and whether the nature of the
service suggested by new entrants and applicants would serve the public
interest must be considered in the light of the Act's philosophy.
Whether or not air transportation is a public utility in the same
sense that gas and electricity and telephone companies are, it should
be clear from the preceding brief exploration of the basic thesis under-
lying the Civil Aeronautics Act that it probably is the most precisely
regulated of all public service industries. Indeed, the Civil Aeronautics
Board has concluded that the "Statutory provisions of (the Civil Aero-
nautics Act) the legislative history, and decisions under the Act plainly
establish that air carriers are to be regulated as 'public utilities' as that
term is generally understood. ''3
It should be sufficient to point out that the nature of existing legis-
lation imposes upon airlines which are certificated a substantial quan-
tum of regulatory responsibility. As will be pointed out, the powers
of the Board over air carriers, all of whom are by definition "common
carriers," are, as the Civil Aeronautics Board itself stated, "consistent
with and similar to those normally applicable to regulated public
utilities38
In order to enter air transportation, you must be certificated by the
Board. In order to receive a certificate, you must show not only that
your service is in the public convenience and necessity but that you
are fit, willing and able to perform it. A certificate, when issued, speci-
fies the cities you may serve and the extent to which you can vary from
the stringent requirements set out in that certificate.
Once an applicant has been certificated, he may not suspend service
without Board approval nor abandon any service without permission
granted by the Board after hearing and argument. However, the Board,
after a hearing which it, itself, may initiate, may alter, amend, modify
or suspend a certificate.
Airline prices are regulated. Individual and joint rates must be
reasonable and non-discriminatory. All rates, classifications and rules
must be published and uniformly observed. Tariffs believed to be
unlawful can be suspended. Adequate service must be provided. A
carrier cannot discriminate among persons, cities or types of traffic.
A carrier certificated to carry the mail, although paid for it only on a
compensatory basis, must carry that mail with a priority over all other
traffic-despite the fact that mail travels more cheaply than people. If
the Post Office Department prescribes additional mail schedules, a
carrier must adhere to such prescriptions.
3 Testimony of Chairman, CAB, Hearings, Revision of Civil Aeronautics,
S. 2647, p. 1171, (1954).
81 Hearings on S. 2647, op. cit.
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There is no phase of an air carrier's operations which is not regu-
lated. Consolidations, mergers, acquisitions of control, purchases,
leases and contracts to operate the properties of other carriers or other
persons are subject to approval, all of this after Board hearing and all
of it subject to the caveat that approval will not create a monopoly in
restraint of competition. Interlocking directorates are subject to ap-
proval. 4 Every pooling arrangement, even if it involves the joint use
of a loading ramp or a gate position, is subject to Board approval.5
Accounts and records must be kept on Civil Aeronautics Board-
prescribed forms. Periodic and special reports must be filed. The
records of every airline are subject to regular Civil Aeronautics Board
inspection and audit. 6 An air carrier is subject to the labor provisions
of the Railway Labor Act.7 Above all, an air carrier is subject to Civil
Aeronautics Board investigation into the management of its business,
its practices, its methods of competition, and anything else at the will
of the regulatory agency. 8
The foregoing requirements have been cited briefly to illustrate
the nature of the business in which certificated air carriers are engaged.
It is important to appreciate that, to a very great extent, the advantages
granted by certification in the public interest are balanced by the
obligations of enfranchisement.
THE RECORD OF CERTIFICATED AIR TRANSPORT
SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE ACT OF 1938
The Civil Aeronautics Act, like others before it and since it, created
a bipartisan regulatory agency, whose members are appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. It has the
unquestioned responsibility to make decisions in the public interest
and the public convenience and necessity.
A logical question is the extent to which, since 1938, the doctrine
of regulated competition has produced, under CAB guidance, a sound
air transport system, with particular reference to its competitive flavor
and the absence of monopoly. Perhaps this question can be answered
best by citing the record of certificated air transport-one shared mutu-
ally by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the regulated airlines.
The 17-year period since the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act
has not been one of undisturbed expansion. The development of air
transportation, airlinewise and aircraftwise, has been handicapped by
World War II and, more recently, by the hot/cold war of 1951-1955.
So, it really is not fair to say that this progress in commercial certifi-
cated air transportation should be measured against a yardstick of a
full or continuing 17-year period.
4 52 Stat. 1002, 49 U.S.C. 489.
5 52 Stat. 1004, as amended by 56 Stat. 301, 49 U.S.C. 492.
6 52 Stat. 1000, 49 U.S.C. 487. See also Part 248 of the Economic Regulations
of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 14 CFR 248.
7 52 Stat. 987, as amended by 56 Stat. 265, 61 Stat. 449, 49 U.S.C. 481.
8 52 Stat. 984, 49 U.S.C. 425.
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In 1938 the Board was handed a route structure which it started
to work on between 1938 and 1940. This was the initial testing period.
Before too long, the airlines went to war. Within six months after
Pearl Harbor, 50 per cent of the total fleet of commercial aircraft was
used in, and as auxiliary to, the Air Transport Command and the
Naval Air Transport Service. Within that same six months' period,
a third of the total complement of certificated airline personnel went
to work for some arm of the Defense Establishment.
From 1946 to 1949 came the postwar adjustment, with an economic
recession suffered by the airlines while the rest of the country was
enjoying unparalleled postwar prosperity. Due to manufacturing de-
lays, it was not until 1950 that new equipment can be said to have
really replaced the workhorse DC-3. Then, the airlines were able to
begin to dig in and to move toward the stability for which they have
been striving since regulation came into being in 1938.
Regulation has benefited air transportation. It has benefited the
country. Regulation was authorized with a trinity of purpose as set
forth in the Civil Aeronautics Act-to serve and develop the commerce
of the United States, to facilitate the postal service, and to benefit
the national defense.
The Contribution to the Furtherance of the National Defense
The contributions of commercial aviation to the national defense
are now history. This was not an accidental occurrence. The ability
of the certificated airline industry to assist at the outset of World War
II was the direct result of the planning and the thinking done by the
then certificated airlines of the United States, cooperating through
their trade group, the Air Transport Association. Reginald Cleveland,
who tells the story of this great wartime achievement in AIR TRANSPORT
AT WAR, has this to say:
"Literally within minutes after the Japs struck at Pearl that
Sunday, the Air Transport Association was in touch with General
Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army; with General
Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces; and with Admiral Towers
in the Navy Department. The headquarters of the Air Transport
Association opened instantly and remained open approximately
twenty-four hours a day through the whole war period. When,
prior to noon of December 7, the regular channels of government
communications failed properly to function and other channels had
proved inadequate for federal needs, the FBI operated through the
headquarters of the Association."
And, despite all the claims that are made that commercial air cargo
carriage was invented after World War II, it should be noted, as Mr.
Cleveland points out, that the development of this area of air carriage
was stimulated and initiated by airlines' joint undertakings.
9 AIR TRANSPORT AT WAR, Cleveland, p. 5, Harper & Brothers (1946).
REGULATED COMPETITION
"Colonel Gorrell (the first President of the Air Transport Asso-
ciation) next convinced the War Department that a survey should
be made of cargo requirements within the domestic United States.
.. The objective of this survey was to develop a real cargo service
for the Army . . ."10
It may be helpful to suggest briefly some specific instances in which
the certificated airlines of the United States substantiated the faith of
the Civil Aeronautics Board and the U. S. Government in their opera-
tions. As Mr. Cleveland so picturesquely states in his book:
"When Rommel's Panzers had General Auchinleck backed up on
the African desert so he could almost hear the boatswain's whistle
on the admiral's flagship at Alexandria, it was transport flight that
saved the day. The Eighth Army commander had anti-tank guns
and shells but the shell fuses had been lost in transit. A plane in
the United States was pulled off its regular run, loaded with fuses
hastily assembled in New York and sent on its way across the
Atlantic. The freshly revitalized artillery cracked the hide of the
Afrika Corps' famed armored legions and saved the gateway to the
East.""
Add to this the pioneering of the South Atlantic routes by certifi-
cated international U. S. carriers, the daily operation over the pre-
viously insurmountable Himalayan "Hump," and the astronomical
airlift of the certificated airlines operating under contract with the Air
Transport Command and the Naval Air Transport Service. The
figures are set out in this same volume:
"At the end of our third year in the shooting war the sum of
miles flown by the airlines under contract to the ATC and NATS
on overseas routes amounted to more than 21/2 billion. Ton-miles
flown in carrying cargo to foreign theaters of war were more than
600 million. Transport-miles flown on foreign routes were nearly
250 million and transport-hours racked up overseas, 1,400,000."12
Air Transport's contribution to the national defense is continuing
and current. Today, in 1955, as a result of planning by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the airlines have created a Civil Reserve Air Fleet consisting
of about half of their modern 4-engine fleet-fast transport aircraft
capable of non-stop over-ocean flight. These 290 airplanes are already
partly modified for military operations and are subject to call-with
their crews-within 48 hours.
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet represents an investment of $400,000,-
000. It would cost the government about $300,000,000 a year to keep
it in operation on a stand-by basis. And its combined airlift-more
than two billion ton-miles annually-is nearly ten times greater than
the capacity of the civil air fleet which performed with such distinction
in World War II.
10 op. cit., p. 59.
11 op. cit., pp. 90-91.
12 op. cit., p. 93.
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Contributions to the Development and Enhancement
of the Postal Service
The first scheduled air services in the United States were exclu-
sively mail services. There were no passenger or freight revenues to
help defray the cost of these services. In a tradition as old as the
Republic, the total cost was borne by the government so that the
public might have faster mail service. And for some time after passen-
ger and cargo business had started to develop, mail remained a major
source of revenue for the airlines.
Today, mail pay is no longer a form of subsidy. The rate for
carrying the mail is simply compensation for the service performed.
This mail rate is determined by the government after full and open
hearings. Today, mail revenue constitutes only 3.5% of the total
airline revenues of all domestic air carriers. And of the cost of each
6 cent air-postage stamp, 1.01 cents go to the airlines as payment and
4.99 cents go to the United States Post Office Department.
Recently, the Post Office Department started a new experiment in
improved postal service for the public-sending first-class mail on a
space available basis between certain points in the United States. In
the first year of the experiment, senders of letters saved nearly ten
billion hours of delivery time and hundreds of millions of letters
reached destination an average of 111A hours sooner than if they had
moved by surface means. The airlines received 3/100 of a penny from
each 3 cent stamp covering a letter which traveled by air under the
experiment-the Post Office realized 2.97 cents.
In 1954, close to 1,400,000,000 letters were flown, an increase of
over 564% since 1938. They were flown into 543 domestic cities, con-
trasted with the 183 receiving such service in 1938. In 1954, the gov-
ernment received about $98,000,000 in postal revenues from domestic
letter air mail, and paid out only $16,500,000 to the airlines for those
letters carried by air-or 1.18 cents to the airlines for every 7.01 cents
paid by the public to the government for letter air mail.
The international mail and subsidy picture is somewhat different.
Almost without exception, it is an important element of national pres-
tige for a country to have an airline carrying its flag abroad and, if
possible, into the United States, the principal source of air traffic.
However, more than prestige is involved since these other nations,
many of whom are our allies, consider that an effective air transporta-
tion system in being is an arm of the national defense, and available
in the event of a national emergency.
Vigorous and intense competition exists in international air trans-
portation and will continue to exist, not only among certificated air-
lines of the United States but between United States carriers on the
one hand and the many nationally-owned and nationally-subsidized
foreign-flag carriers of other nations. In the postwar years 1946-1953,
the wholly-owned airline entities of Great Britain, France, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, Canada, Argentina, Scandinavia, Switzerland, Vene-
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zuela and Brazil received a total of $778,000,000 in subsidy from their
governments in direct cash, government stock payments, government
loans, and value of equipment provided.
In the face of this kind of subsidized foreign competition, the inter-
national airlines of the United States have reduced their reliance on
subsidy so that such revenues will amount to 4.8 per cent of total
revenues in fiscal year 1956. In addition, in 1954, the money required
to operate the total U. S. airline system was $1,294,000,000. Of that
sum, the government put up about $67,000,000, the airlines put up
$1,227,000,000. For every dollar of the $67,000,000 put up by the
government to ensure air service where it was needed in 1954, the
airlines developed $5.39 in return for the government. In addition,
the airlines paid federal gas and oil taxes of $16,000,000 for their share
of the use of the federal airways system, although it is calculated that
only $12,500,000 would have covered their share for the maintenance
and operation of this system.
Further, in the year 1954, the airlines developed revenues for the
federal government. The certificated scheduled airlines paid federal
income taxes of $67,300,000; the certificated scheduled airlines paid
miscellaneous excise taxes of $2,000,000; the certificated scheduled air-
lines accounted for transportation excise taxes of $120,000,000; the cer-
tificated scheduled airlines created total postage revenues for the Post
Office Department of $171,700,000-or a grand total of $361,000,000.
Benefits to the Foreign and Domestic Commerce
Next it will be well to note some of the benefits which have
accrued, as the Act intended, to our domestic and foreign commerce
and trade in the form of more service, improved service and intensified
competition.
1. Regulation Has Developed U. S. Domestic, International and
Overseas Air Transportation
An important measure of the growth in usefulness of certificated
air transport service is in the increase in the number of revenue pas-
senger-miles operated-that is, the number of miles over which paying
passengers were carried. The revenue passenger-miles operated by
American-flag carriers on both domestic and international routes
increased from a half billion (533,052,000) in 1938 to 20 billion
(20,511,600,000) in 1954. This is an increase of more than 39 times,
or almost 4,000 per cent. The number of seat miles operated, which
represents the number of seat miles offered for sale to the public,
increased from 1,067,558,000 in 1938 to 33,140,000,000 in 1954. This
is an increase of almost 32 times the operation in 1938.
The number of passengers carried increased from 11/2 million
(1,536,111) to more than 35 million (35,184,000). For every passenger
carried in 1938, the certificated airlines in 1954 carried 23. Cargo
transportation increased from 2,550,000 ton-miles in 1938 to 347,000,-
000 ton-miles in 1954. The total airline revenues from traffic other
than mail increased from $33,600,594 in 1938 to more than one billion
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dollars ($1,289,000,000). During this time, the total number of air-
planes in use by certificated airlines increased from about 300 to
1,500-a fivefold increase.
The number of certificated airlines has increased from 22 to 59 in
1954. Miles of authorized airline routes have increased many times.
Much of the increased milage reflects the creation and addition of air
carriers and competition between the points served.
2. Regulation Has Improved Service
Statistics and maps alone do not reflect the innovations and the
high quality of services which are the hallmarks of American air
transportation. It was the American air carrier who first conquered
the barriers of oceanic distance and who accustomed the domestic
traveling public to the convenience of stewardess service, to compli-
mentary meals, and to standard credit arrangements for transportation.
Not only have the American airlines led the world in luxurious
and safe airline equipment, but also the airlines offer a truly nation-
wide transport service. The traveler can go into the ticket office of
any certificated airlines in the United States and buy a ticket to any
of the 543 cities in the United States served by an airline, and to any
place abroad. The magnitude of such an undertaking is evidenced by
the vast number of facilitating agreements and arrangements among
the airlines of the United States which were necessary to permit any
ticket agent of one to issue tickets valid upon any of the others, to use
standard ticket and baggage forms and uniform reservation and ticket-
ing procedures, and to reduce service costs in handling traffic.
If the traveler wishes to go to a city other than the 543 cities served
by the airlines, he can make arrangements in the airline ticket office
for airplane taxi service from the airline point, or rent a car at the
airline point to travel to the off-line point of his destination. He can
use his airline credit card to charge all of these transportation services.
Substantially similar service is available to travelers wishing to go
to any point in the free world served by airlines. Thus, a traveler in
Grand Island, Nebraska, can buy an airline ticket that will take him
to New Delhi, India, or Melbourne, Australia, and can check his bag-
gage from that point through to his destination.
This same type of national and worldwide service is also offered
by the airlines in transporting cargo. A shipment tendered to an air-
line in Bangor, Maine, will be accepted for delivery at any airline
point in the United States and moved to destination on a single air
waybill. Door-to-door service is offered throughout the United States.
The tariffs governing not only the air transport service but also the
pick-up and delivery service are available in a single book, readily
available and useful to shippers and consignees. By the same token,
a shipper in Grand Island, Nebraska, can send air freight to Djakarta,
Indonesia, and can get the only air waybill he needs when he tenders
the shipment at Grand Island.
REGULATED COMPETITION
These worldwide services are possible by virtue of working agree-
ments not only between the airlines in the United States but also
between practically all of the airlines in the free world. They are
intelligible to and honored by air carriers employees in Topeka, Kansas,
or Karachi, Pakistan.
Probably the air service system is the only direct carrier system
offering such a worldwide service. The benefits of this worldwide
service are enhanced by a comparison with the normal international
movements of cargo. A shipment from Grand Island to New Delhi
by surface carrier would involve one or more transactions from Grand
Island to New York, at least a second transaction-and a second trans-
portation document-for the water carriage from New York, and a
third transportation arrangement would have to be made when the
shipment arrived at Bombay. These transactions in air transportation
are reduced to one, and these services are possible by virtue of a vast
number of intercarrier agreements reviewed by and subject to the
approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
This progress was made possible by the fact that air transport is
a regulated public service industry. The keystone of this regulation
is the certificate requirement. Under it, and before authority to operate
may be granted, an applicant must show a need for service, in the
public interest, and a fitness and ability to operate the service.
3. Regulation Has Increased and Intensified Competition and
Prevented Monopoly
a. The Domestic Route Systems
Two maps illustrate the increase in the route miles in the United
States. The first map, figure 1, shows the routes authorized in August,
1938, and the second map, figure 2, shows the routes authorized at the
end of 1954. The number of cities served increased from 183 to 543.
Even this does not show the full extent of the routes currently
operated. First, the map does not show the duplicate services between
many cities. For example, over the route between New York and
Chicago, four carriers currently operate; similarly, over the route
between Washington and Chicago, four airlines operate; and over the
route between New York and Los Angeles, three airlines provide
service.
Secondly, this map does not show the interchange services. Between
Miami and Los Angeles, a passenger can board an aircraft at one point
and fly through to the other, in the course of which he will travel over
the routes of the three airlines in the same aircraft. There are currently
12 of these interchange arrangements, which provide a service com-
parable to an additional through route.
b. The International Route Systems
Three maps graphically illustrate the extent of the increase in
competition in international operations.
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In 1938 there were two short routes into Canada, a bare segment
into the Caribbean and Mexico, one route along each coast of South
and Latin America, and a route to the Philippines and Hong Kong
via the Central Pacific. In 1954 note the extensive U. S. flag compe-
tition across the Atlantic and Pacific to Europe, the Middle East, India,
Japan, in the Caribbean and down through all of Latin America.
The third map shows the concentration of foreign-flag lines to
gateway points over the Atlantic, the unbelievable number of foreign
carriers in the Caribbean and Latin America (not all the smaller ones
are shown), and the surprising number of foreign-owned airlines
competing with our carriers for the thin traffic over the Pacific to the
Orient and Australasia.
This last map of foreign-flag competition, figure 5, does not show
the recently-inaugurated operation of West Germany's Lufthansa. Nor
does it show the extent to which the grant of air rights, by our govern-
ment, to foreign-flag lines diverts transcontinental air traffic. To date,
Scandinavian Air Lines alone has been authorized to fly the polar
route and carry passengers all the way from the West Coast without
their having to use U. S. carriers to reach East Coast debarkation points.
The British, Australians, Japanese and Germans are currently nego-
tiating for similar authority.
In addition to the fact that there are few routes in the international
system which are operated exclusively by any one U. S. flag carrier,
there is the additional fact of competition between United States car-
riers, on the one hand, and carriers of foreign countries, on the other.
c. Traditional Transportation Patterns
Traditionally, in order to provide transportation to as much of the
public as possible, regulation has been required. In 1953, service was
provided to over 540 airports in the domestic United States. Fifty-five
out of every 100 passengers who used air transportation came from
only 15 of those 543 airports. Some 528 airports accounted for the
remaining 45 per cent. It is clear that, if there had been no regulation,
the quantity of service and the extent to which service has been pro-
vided to different and less populated areas of the United States would
have been curtailed substantially. Or, to put it differently, an over-
whelming majority of the cities to which the airlines provide service
just do not generate enough traffic to warrant operations if air transport
were not regulated and was subject only to the rules of the "free"
market place.
Existing traffic patterns within the United States require regulation.
It is evident to anyone who analyzes the airline service to the 48 states
that the quantity and extent of the service now existing would be
impossible without regulation. Regardless of the number of passengers
enplaned or the number of cities served, between 70 and 90 per cent
of all traffic generated within a particular state comes from one or two
cities.
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As an example, in 1953, 13 airlines served 18 cities in New York
State and yet 80 per cent of the traffic was developed out of the New
York City airports. As further examples, note the following: in Cali-
fornia, although 36 cities were served, 85 per cent of the traffic was
out of Los Angeles and San Francisco; in Florida, although 21 cities
were provided service by 5 airlines, 71 per cent of the traffic developed
in Miami and Jacksonville; in Michigan, with service being provided
to 18 cities, 80 per cent of the traffic originated in Detroit; and in
Illinois, 96 per cent of the passengers at 11 cities in the state were
enplaned at Chicago.
It is surprising to some that trunk carriers as well as local service
carriers provide service to the smaller cities in the United States. The
trunk lines are able to do this because the losses sustained at these mar-
ginal cities, which also deserve the advantages of air transportation, are
compensated for by the revenues developed at the greater traffic-produc-
ing areas-most of which, for long-haul-carriage purposes, are highely
competitive. Figures submitted by the Civil Aeronautics Board for six
of the largest domestic trunk lines show a substantial quantity of what
the Board called "marginal or loss points": American Airlines with
23 such points served of the 61 on its route system; Delta-CkS with
28 points of its total of 48; Eastern with 40 of its 81 points; National
with 21 of its 30; TWA with 18 of its 51; United with 35 of its 61.18
d. The Nature of the Development of a Balanced, Competitive,
Self-Sufficient Trunkline System
Against this record of demonstrated progress are advanced many
arguments which suggest that competitive opportunity in the industry
has been reduced rather than expanded in the face of an unlimited
air carrier market.
One of the arguments frequently advanced is that the trunkline
industry has contracted from 16 carriers which existed in 1938 to just
13. Proponents of this view usually suggest that the 13 may ultimately
become fewer. Of course, it is a possibility if, in the judgment of the
Board, such contraction is necessary to maintain a strong air transport
system, still competitive but better balanced. No one seriously contem-
plates or predicts that there will be a reduction to four or five trunks.
However, there is every reason to believe that those which exist today
will become better balanced and compete more effectively with one
another.
In 1938 there were in existence a number of air carriers who were
not very strong. In fact, it is wrong to call all of them in existence at
that time trunk carriers. If, however, that categorization is used for
1938, it is only fair to say that the original 16 are now 26. For,
although 16 "grandfather" carriers are now 13, there are an additional
13 domestic local service airlines of varying sizes, all of them substan-
tially larger than a majority of the original "grandfather" carriers at
the time of their certification.
1 Hearings, S. 2647, op. cit., p. 764.
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From 1938 to date, the Board grappled with the problem not only
of straightening out the grandfather systems but of expanding some
carriers, duplicating the operations of other carriers, and merging and
consolidating weak carriers into stronger carriers-all in the interest
of increased service and reduced subsidy.
The basic problem was, and is, to increase competition while
strengthening existing carriers to be self-sustaining in keeping with the
will of Congress as expressed in the Act. The determination which
had to be made was whether you introduce additional groups into the
industry or whether you strengthen the carriers already in business as
a matter of general public interest, and economy to the taxpayer.
Four striking examples of the extent to which regulation has
increased competition, decreased subsidy, and provided for more effec-
tive competition and for better balance in the air transportation system
is the job that was accomplished by the Board in the instances of
Western. Air Lines on the Pacific coast, National Airlines on the
Atlantic coast, and Continental and Braniff in mid-America. Figure
6 shows the four lines as they existed in 1938 and figures 7 and 8 show
them as they were in 1954. In 1938 National was a carrier with two
unconnected southernly segments, one across the State of Florida and
the other from Jacksonville to New Orleans. In 1954 National is a
long-haul operator but has still not neglected the service it continues
to provide to the smaller and less profitable cities on its system. In
1938 Western Air Lines had a thin route from Los Angeles to Salt
Lake and then to Montana. The 1954 Western system, built over the
years and which is responsible for removing the airline from subsidy
and making it self-sufficient, illustrates how effective and intelligent
regulation results in more service and less subsidy.
Continental Air Lines' system, at the date of the passage of the
Act, was represented by a thin line and an even thinner route from
El Paso to Denver with little in between of any traffic consequence.
Today, Continental's efforts toward self-sufficiency have been materially
assisted by extensions into the East as far as Kansas City, southeast to
Houston and, most recently, by its acquisition of Pioneer, a local service
carrier with a complementary route structure. In 1938, Braniff served
the center of the country south from Chicago to Brownsville, with a
thin segment from Amarillo to Dallas. Today, Braniff's reliance on
domestic subsidy has been substantially reduced and it is providing
more and better service with very little subsidy, as a result of the better
balance developed over the years. It was permitted to absorb, and
thereby insure the continued service of, the economically-threatened
Mid-Continent Airlines.
The Board had the opportunity of developing these carriers and
others into strong units free from subsidy, and creating competition in
that way, or permitting additional groups to enter the business, leaving
the weak perpetually impotent and overlaying new carriers on top of
them. It rejected, as the Act dictates, the acceptance of a doctrine of
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"competition for competition's sake," and took the course of devel-
oping both a competitive and a strong air transport system for the
maximum public convenience and necessity, as the statute requires.
Although details of the Board's various decisions have been contested
according to the interests of respective parties, on an over-all basis,
the Board was clearly right-particularly when one reviews the progress
of the trunk lines, which shows that the initial pioneering was pretty
good.
e. The Extent of Competition in Air Transportation Today
The pretense that certificated air transportation is a monopoly is
essentially an exercise in semantics. A scare word is employed to pic-
ture a situation which is far from monopolistic. On specific routes in
the United States, there is more competition among the certificated
airlines than exists in any other form of common carrier transportation,
in addition to the competition from private carriers. Three airlines
operate from New York to Los Angeles and from New York to San
Francisco. Four airlines operates between New York and Chicago and
Washington and Chicago. Three airlines compete between Boston and
New York and New York and Washington. Three airlines compete
between San Francisco and Los Angeles.
The important fact is that this duplicative competition exists
essentially between those cities to which the monopoly-criers would
like to fly. The discontented, who attack the existing system, are not
interested in providing air service, now or in the future, to cities like
Binghamton, New York; Springfield, Illinois; Tallahassee, Florida;
Odessa, Texas; Ogden, Utah; Sacramento, California; Medford, Ore-
gon; Topeka, Kansas; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania or any of the multi-
hundred airports generating little traffic, but to which trunk line
operations are supported by the revenues generated by the relative
handful of large metropolitan areas.
Competitive duplication of service between the 50 pairs of U. S.
cities ranking first in traffic volume increased from 45.9% before World
War II to 92% in 1954, according to the airline passenger surveys of
the Civil Aeronautics Board. Presently, there is competitive duplica-
tion by three and four carriers for over 61% of the traffic of these first
50 pairs of cities. Further evidence of the extent of competition
and its intensity in air transportation was submitted by the Civil
Aeronautics Board to the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, in connection with S. 2647,
demonstrating conclusively the extent to which the Board, since 1938,
has created extensive competition over substantially all of the principal
traffic routes in the United States. A more specific example was sub-
mitted to the Air Transport Association by one of the largest carriers
in the country. This carrier pointed out that, in 1938, only 11.44
per cent of the traffic between the pairs of cities then certificated to
that carrier was competitively served; in terms of dollars and cents,
of a total of one month's revenues of $16,300,000, only $1,865,000 was
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derived from competitive traffic. In 1955, over these same points,
90.96 per cent of the traffic is now competitively served; a sample
month in 1955 shows that, of total revenues of over $28,000,000, better
than $25,500,000 was derived from traffic between pairs of cities served
by the aforementioned carrier and at least one additional air carrier.
f. Competition with Other Competing Forms of Transportation
and the Future of the Common Carrier Market
Air carriers compete vigorously with one another. Even more
important, air carriers are competing, in the travel market, with the
railroads, steamships, bus lines and, most important of all, with private
automobiles-shortly to be a source of even greater competition in the
light of the proposed highway construction program.
It is important to look briefly at the nature of the common carrier
market in the United States today. In 1946 the common carrier market
amounted to a total of over 90 billion revenue passenger-miles. In
1954 that market-the rails, the buses, and the airlines-had declined
to a little over 57 billion revenue passenger-miles. Figure 9 illustrates
that decline. It is true that the airlines have increased their participa-
tion in this declining market-in fact, have created air travel where
none existed before-but it is interesting to see where the greatest
penetration of this market has been. In 1953 the airlines had a little
over 71 per cent of the total common carriage over 1,000 miles. How-
ever, of the total of 532,000,000 passengers carried in common carriage
in 1953, all but 6,900,000 or 1.3 per cent, traveled less than 1,000 mile
distances, and 511,700,000 less than 500 miles. As shown by figure 10,
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the airlines carried a relatively smaller percentage of the passengers
traveling less than 500 miles than either the bus companies or the
railroads.
Accordingly, when one talks about monopoly in air transportation,
he should consider carefully the extent to which the entire market is
still open to competition, rather than just a portion of it. These
figures suggest that the area of greatest prospective penetration is not
in those segments which the airlines have successfully penetrated to
date but rather in the short-haul field. And, in the short-haul field,
there can be no denying that the Civil Aeronautics Board, in its cer-
tification of local airlines (whose operating rights have now been made
permanent by legislation), has provided for even more intense compe-
tition for that market. As equipment more suitable for penetrating the
short-haul market is developed, competition no doubt will become
even keener.
g. Specific Actions of CAB to Foster Competition by Certification,
to Prevent Monopoly, and to Permit New Entry into
Air Transportation
The "cry monopoly" approach has two basic weaknesses: first, it
ignores the vast majority of the actions taken by the Board since 1938,
many-if not most-of which have been adverse to the interests of the
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"grandfather" carriers; second, it is based on misleading terminology
and innuendo. This is especially apparent in the acceptance of the
recurrent propaganda that the Civil Aeronautics Board has never
certificated a new domestic "trunkline" carrier. The fact is that the
CAB has certificated many new carriers, both domestic and overseas.
Many others, such as Western, Continental, National and Braniff, have
been converted into "trunk lines" by CAB certification: These charges
are, at any rate, substantially refuted by a review of the Board's deci-
sions over the years. The Board, since 1938, has:
Certificated Northeast to compete with American between New
York and Boston;
Certificated National to compete with Eastern between New
York and Florida;
Certificated Delta to compete with Eastern between Chicago-
Atlanta and Miami;
Certificated Capital to compete with Eastern between New
York-New Orleans; American between New York-Memphis; TWA
between New York-Pittsburgh-Detroit;
Certificated Northwest (the smaller carrier) to compete with
United between New York and the Pacific Northwest and between
Chicago and the Pacific Northwest;
Certificated Colonial (a smaller carrier) to compete with Pan
American between New York and Bermuda;
Certificated Western Air Lines to compete with United between
Los Angeles and San Francisco and later extended Western to
Seattle;
Selected Northwest for the North Pacific route in perference
to Pan American;
Authorized Alaska Airlines and Pacific Northern to operate
Seattle-Alaska services in competition with Pan American and
Northwest, for the first time giving each of these carriers entry
into the United States;
Authorized Delta-C&S and National to compete with Pan Amer-
ican in the Caribbean;
Selected local service carriers to operate throughout the coun-
try; the trunk lines were invariably excluded from this field of
operation even though they fought hard to secure authorization,
and despite the present and even greater prospective competition
between the trunks and the local service airlines;
Certificated 4 air freight carriers (all former non-scheduled
operators) to operate the best air freight routes in the country-
over the violent opposition of the entire domestic trunkline in-
dustry;
Certificated Riddle Airlines (a former irregular) to operate a
New York-Puerto Rico freight service;
Certificated Aerovias Sud Americana (a former non-scheduled
carrier) to operate freight services between Tampa/St. Petersburg-
Havana/Central America;
Certificated Mackey Air Transport and Midet Airlines (new
carriers) to operate between Florida and the Bahamas;
Certificated Trans-Pacific Airlines (formerly non-scheduled) to
operate alongside Hawaiian Airlines in the Hawaiian Islands;
Granted a blanket exemption to the Air Freight Forwarders
against the solid opposition of the trunkline carriers;
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Required the lowering of airline fares to four and one-half cents
per mile in 1945;
Suspended certain proposed coach fares of trunk lines in 1948,
thus preventing them from meeting non-scheduled fares for a con-
siderable period of time;
Adopted increasingly drastic policies of disallowances in deter-
mining mail rates, resulting in the payment of lower mail rates to
air carriers;
Imposed severe labor protective conditions on carriers involved
in mergers and consolidations;
Disapproved acquisition of small carriers by large carriers in
the cases of American-Mid-Continent; United-Western;
Increased the amount of territorial and international competi-
tion among U. S. carriers so that today there are two across the
Atlantic; two across the Pacific; five into Latin America, including
one all-cargo operator; three to Puerto Rico from the U. S., includ-
ing an all-cargo line; four to Alaska; and three from the Mainland
to Hawaii.
In contrast to these and many other actions which were usually
taken contrary to the opposition of the certificated carriers in general
or of the larger carriers in particular, conclusions as to "monopoly"
are based on the isolated and misleading fact that the CAB has not
certificated a "new trunk line." In the final analysis all this means is
that the CAB has not certificated a new carrier to duplicate the existing
competitive services between the six or eight greatest traffic-producing
cities in the country. Certainly, it does not prove the accusation that
the CAB is, in any sense, monopoly-minded or "industry-dominated."
If the CAB has fostered "monopoly," how can the fact that it
authorized four former non-scheduled carriers (one of whom found
it unprofitable to continue to operate) to operate scheduled freight
services between all of the major freight-producing cities in the coun-
try, one to operate to Puerto Rico and the other with extensive routes
to Latin America be explained? This was done over the bitter opposi-
tion of the certificated carriers on the basis of a record which barely
sustained the finding of public convenience and necessity. Operating
results have proven the prematurity of the unbelievable optimism
adduced in the Air Freight Case which led to these certifications. Even
before this certification, the larger trunk lines had explored air freight
and, today, are endeavoring to penetrate that market to an even
greater extent.
And how does one explain the hundreds of other decisions where
the CAB has authorized competition with the so-called "Big Four"?
Certainly, National (then the smallest air carrier) held no hypnotic
.control over the Board when its route was extended into New York
to compete with Eastern. Many other cases can be cited where the
smaller, less powerful carriers were certificated for new routes by the
CAB over the objection of the larger carriers.
The most significant factor in this whole debate of alleged "monop-
oly" is the fact that the Board inherited an air transportation network
which was very much unbalanced in terms of size and economic
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opportunity. A few carriers had the better routes-including the big-
gest cities and long hauls. Continuance of that situation would have
meant the sentencing of the small carriers to a permanent subsidy
status. Faced with this situation, the Board generally developed re-
gional carriers into trunklines, selected the smaller trunk lines to
operate the new competitive routes, and created a new class of regional
carriers known as local service airlines. At the same time, the Board
granted some route extensions to the large carriers, because they were
in a position to provide a large amount of one-carrier service in the
public convenience.
The net result of the Board's actions during the 17 years under the
Act has been to build up substantially all of the trunk lines to a
position where, although by no means wealthy, they are at least cur-
rently self-sufficient. At the same time, the Board has established a
system of competitive service over just about all of the major air routes
of the country. After the war, the addition of new carriers, many of
them former non-scheduled operators, took the form of granting cer-
tificates for which they applied to institute scheduled local service
systems.
THERE Is NEITHER MONOPOLY NOR CONCENTRATION IN
CERTIFICATED AIR TRANSPORTATION
Concentration is another one-word argument designed to prove
the existence of monopoly and establish the necessity for greater
"freedom of entry." This argument is based on the fact that, over the
years, the original trunkline carriers have participated in an air trans-
port economy which has expanded some 40 times. Pie charts and bar
charts are used to show the extent to which a few of the larger trunk
lines have been getting bigger and bigger and sharing, it is said, dis-
proportionately in the total amount of available commercial revenues.
Industrial concentration, even in unregulated businesses, is a phrase
of art. Such concentration leads to non-competitive results which
simply are not evident in the commercial air transportation system
today. Perhaps it may be worthwhile to look at some of the elements
of concentration very briefly in order to appreciate better the non-
concentrate situation in certificated air transport.
Thorstein Veblen noted 50 years ago some significant factors about
consolidation:
"In great measure the saving effected is a saving of the costs
of business management and of the competitive costs of marketing
products and services, rather than a saving in the prime costs of
production.... The amount of 'business' that has to be transacted
per unit of product is much greater where the various related
industrial processes are managed in severalty than where several
of them are brought under one business management. . . . The
greater the parcelment in point of ownership, the greater the
amount of business work that has to be done in connection with
given output of goods and services .... It is in doing away with
unnecessary business transactions and industrially futile maneuver-
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ing on the part of independent firms that the promoter of combina-
tions finds his most telling opportunity."' 4
The hallmarks of concentration are: reduced efforts to sell and
the consequent reductions in expenditures in sales promotion; non-
expanding markets; maintained or increased prices; static ingenuity
and imaginativeness; little inventive progress; prevalence of mergers,
consolidations and acquisitions; and excessive profits.
In air transportation, there have been only three trunk line merg-
ers, acquisitions or consolidations since 1938 and, once the local
service lines were shaken out of the formative stage as a going business,
only one consolidation. This is in sharp contrast with the many
mergers effected before the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act, and
with the Board's rejection of a number of proposed mergers. 15
Competition between the airlines today benefits the public both
in service and price. Further, the operating results of the domestic
trunkline carriers, admittedly the most profitable segment in the
industry, do not reflect that these airlines have enjoyed excessive
profits or that their stockholders have received even a satisfactory
return on their investment.
Better Air Service at the Same or Lower Cost to the Consumer
The aircraft being used by the certificated carriers is, perhaps, one
of the best reflections of the kind of service being provided. Since the
war, $884,000,000 have been spent in the purchase of operating equip-
ment and in buying and developing transport airplanes. Anyone who
has reviewed the whole picture will see what is causing it. One carrier
will buy a fleet of then-modern equipment. Soon, with technological
advances, he will find that his competitors have acquired or improved
aircraft to out-compete him. He then buys newer, faster, more eco-
nomic aircraft. That has gone on in rapid succession until now with
the new DC-7's and Super-G Constellations, transcontinental non-stop
service, is provided with aircraft specifically designed for that purpose.
This is probably the most outstanding mark of service improvement
in recent years. No doubt similar aircraft will be flying non-stop over
any ocean and between any continents in the not too distant future.
One airline (Capital) is about to institute operations with British-
made turbo-props and another (American) has just announced a
$65,000,000 purchase of new American-manufactured turbo-prop air-
craft.
These improvements in equipment have brought greater traveling
comfort and greater reliability to the public, in most instances at no
greater cost. Notwithstanding the fact that every cost an airline pays
has gone up markedly since 1946, the actual prices charged by the
airlines, unlike most other businesses, have held steady and now are
14 Thorstein Veblen, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, New
York, 1915, pp. 45-48.15 For example, note the following CAB orders denying proposed mergers,
acquisitions or consolidations: E-1418, E-4540, E-4617, E-4472, E-5205, E-5594
and E-8146.
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going down. The price to the consumer for coach service, which con-
stitutes about 37 per cent of the total service being offered today by
certificated airlines, is set at a lower unit price than was being charged
back in 1938.
The Airlines Have Not Enjoyed Excessive Profits
It really makes very little difference what measures are used to
assess the bigness of air transportation; this alleged bigness is not
reflected in the profits turned by the airlines or in their operating
results over any respectable period of time. The United States certifi-
cated airline industry grossed over a billion dollars in 1954, to be sure,
but that, large as it may appear, is but a recent development. In addi-
tion, that billion dollar figure is merely a gross income picture and not
a proper portrayal of the industry's earning capacity, even in one of
its most profitable years. Against a total sales gross of $1,412,000,000
in 1954, the industry showed a profit of only $69,000,000, which was
about 4.8 per cent of the total product sold.
The industry's affirmative financial operating results for 1954 are
not symptomatic of equally good results over a very substantial period.
Not so long ago, in 1946, the domestic trunkline segment of the indus-
try suffered a net loss after mail pay of almost $6,000,000.
By 1947 conditions had become even more serious; losses after mail
pay amounted to $20,000,000. The earned surplus of the domestic
trunklines fell from $58,600,000 on December 31, 1945, to $10,300,000
on December 31, 1947. Long-term debt increased from $24,400,000
or 16 per cent of the net worth of domestic trunklines to $161,700,000
or 90 per cent of their net worth. Several carriers formerly on a
compensatory (or non-subsidy) mail rate basis were in so dangerous a
financial position then that emergency subsidy relief had to be granted
in the form of increased temporary mail rates. A total of thirteen
emergency mail rate orders were issued during the fiscal year 1947.
The Board's report to Congress indicated concern over the "precipi-
tous" drop in net earnings of the industry. In the Board's own words
in its 1947 Annual Report:
"There followed, in the wake of these losses and changed capital
structures, aggravated financial difficulties in the case of some car-
riers, resulting in petitions for higher mail rates, drastic retrench-
ment programs, cancellation of equipment orders, incurrence of
large amounts of debt, and, in one instance, the sale of a route."'16
So critical was the situation that the Civil Aeronautics Board insti-
tuted investigations of the operations, management and route structure
of five of the domestic trunkline carriers. The purpose of this investi-
gation was to determine whether there should be any major amputa-
tions in the industry (which the Board had just expanded so rapidly
and so extensively) by elimination of routes or mergers or consolida-
tions or otherwise.
16 1947 Annual Report, Civil Aeronautics Board, p. 7.
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It was not until 1949 that there was some improvement in the
financial condition of the industry; but it was still not on a financially
solid basis. The domestic trunklines in that year operated at a modest
profit after mail pay but would have suffered a loss of $31,600,000
without mail pay.
The simple fact of the matter is that, up until recently, the over-all
record of earnings of the domestic trunklines, the most profitable seg-
ment in the industry, has been poor. Were it not for mail payments
in the years up until 1950, the record would have been abysmal.
Happily, the 1954 figures of net operating income and profit for
the domestic trunk lines can be regarded as almost wholly without
subsidy since, in 1954, the subsidy paid to the trunk lines amounted
to only 4/10 of 1 per cent of their total revenues-or about $4,600,000
in subsidy of total revenues of over $980,000,000.
It may seem that the industry has settled down. It seemed this way
in 1946 but, following that, came the airline recession. Even if the
industry has settled down, it has some time to go before it finds recog-
nition in the financial markets of the country, where financial results
over ten-year periods are the criteria for judging stability.
An example of an expansion which may or may not be healthy is
illustrated by the fact that, since 1951, the domestic trunkline industry
alone has increased its usefulness to the public by 60 per cent, in terms
of revenue passenger-miles flown. Yet the net operating income of the
domestic trunk lines-the most profitable segment in the industry-in
1954 was substantially the same as it was in 1951. In other words, as
figures 11 and 12 indicate, the industry has sold 60 per cent more of
its product but has netted no additional profits.
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The industry must accumulate some reserves out of its earnings.
This applies equally to the big airlines as well as the smaller airlines.
It has been conservatively estimated that in the next ten years no less
than $1,750,000,000 will be needed for new capital expenditures;
likely this figure will be anywhere from 30 to 50 per cent greater.
That money will be needed for the following programs: substantial
replacement of the reciprocating engine fleet with a turbo-prop fleet;
the introduction of a specially designed cargo fleet or a major conver-
sion of the existing fleet to cargo types; the addition to, and-to a
limited extent-the replacement of, the existing fleet with the heli-
copter or a convertiplane; the addition of a substantial fleet of jet
aircraft; major capital expenditures for accompanying ground, flight
line and airways equipment and facilities.
Where is that money to come from, particularly in the light of the
competitive nature of an industry for a common carrier market which
is declining and which will be harder to penetrate? Certainly, equity
funds will not be readily available if there is a continuing dilution of
present markets, if the Board were inequitably to create a new class
of carriers privileged only to drain the rich revenues from a few top
traffic-production points, and if earnings are to stay at levels too low
to attract this equity capital.
One of the best indices of stability and profitability, on a sound
continuing basis, is the place airline securities hold today in the capital
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markets of the country. Even after 17 years of regulated operation,
airline securities are not attractive to the institutional investor, to
whom, in large measure, the airlines will have to look for their financ-
ing. Basically, the standards of the institutional investor are established
by law or by investment committees; and the airlines, as a result of
their record of instability (measured by dividend payments, among
other things), cannot today meet these standards.
The current Security and Industry Survey of Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner 9c Beane (May, 1955) categorizes no airline securities as "in-
vestment type" or "liberal income" types, cites only two as "good
quality," and classifies nine others as "speculative." In discussing
market prospects for the airlines as "relatively favorable" for the
future, the report has this to say:
"The outlook for the air transportation industry is less be-
clouded, looking ahead to the summer months, than for a good many
years past but despite this fact most airline securities must still
be regarded as inherently speculative holdings. The reason for this
lies largely with (1) the high leverage factor inherent in airline op-
erations as reflected by the fact that relatively small shifts in the
'load factor' (number of available seats occupied) bring about wide
variations in the profitability of operations; (2) the speed of tech-
nological developments which makes for relatively quick obsoles-
cence of equipment and requires substantial capital investments at
relatively short intervals."
If the industry had enjoyed excessive profiits, analyses of this type
would not be made. Even if industry earnings had been stable over
any period of time, the problem of external financing, to meet its
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needs, would not exist. The domestic trunk lines constitute the most
profitable segment in the industry. The money they keep out of gross
is particularly important in a business which has grown so quickly and
in so short a period of time and has been constantly subjected to the
vicissitudes of an inflationary spiral almost since its inception.
Most economic data in air transportation is measured from 1938,
the date of the passage of the Act. Its greatest development, however,
has been since 1946. Since 1938 general cost trends have had, as
previously indicated, a significant effect on air transportation. At the
outset, in order to compete in the travel market, the value of the
product had to be held within the range of the then present and pros-
pective consumer. With costs for supplies (soft goods and, to an even
greater extent, durable goods), food, and labor rising-92 per cent in
consumer goods and 128 per cent in average airline pay checks since
1938-the basic fares have remained at the same low stable level and,
in fact, the yield to the industry is going down, due to the increasing
amount of coach scheduling. Figures 13 and 14 show that by contrast
with rail and bus fares, airlines have kept the price line stable since
1938.
These economic trends have been general in nature. They apply
to air transportation as a part of the general industrial and marketing
economy, just as they apply to steel, automobile production, rail
transport, electric and gas utilities, and other fields of industrial enter-
prise. The significant fact is that in few, if any, areas have products-
particularly the better product the airlines sell today-been available
to the consumer in 1954 for substantially the same price as they were
available to the consumer in 1938. As mentioned previously, one of
the reasons for this was the necessity that air transportation, from the
outset, be made available and attractive to consumers with a choice of
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transportation media in an effort to penetrate the travel market in
both the business and vacation/pleasure fields.
These general economic trends have been up-in terms of things
bought, wages paid, and state and federal taxes assessed-as the value
of the dollar declined. Essentially, these cost trends are outside the
control of the industry, but it must be emphasized that the upward
spiral before and since the war has undoubtedly hit the air transport
industry harder than other industries, as specific instances will reflect.
Measuring the air transport industry from the date of the initiation
of its regulatory controls, there has been little opportunity since 1938
to develop any healthful financial reserves. This is partially true
because of the way in which cost trends have affected the industry
directly.
The key to the industry's inability to provide for the proverbial
rainy day is the picture of its inability to finance reequipment pro-
grams out of depreciation reserves, surplus or, finally, a combination
of these and equity money. Equipment is the single biggest element
of fixed cost. Of course, no one would suggest that, in a technologically
dynamic industry, depreciation should or could pay all the bill for
progress. Unfortunately, though the industry has looked elsewhere
for financing, equity dollars to pay for reequipment have been hard
to find and, in more instances than have been healthy, it has been
forced to borrow in order to purchase this new equipment. Equipment
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is costing more each year, as witness the $2,000,000 DC-7's and Super-G
Constellations contrasted with the relatively inexpensive DC-3 of pre-
World War II years. Coincident with the acquisition of new aircraft,
there is always the necessity to acquire new airborne electronic devices
and modern up-to-date ground equipment, which also have been
affected by the inflationary spiral.
From 1946 to 1954 the industry had an excess of capital expendi-
tures over depreciation of $268,000,000, figure 15. That had to come
from somewhere, either internally or externally. Internally, the most
important source was retained earnings. Even that is misleading, since
many of the companies had no retained earnings. Actually, even with
all retained earnings added to depreciation, there was still a total of
$100,000,000 over and above both of them, which had to be drawn
from external sources. This total would have been larger if, over the
years, the industry had paid out the dividends normal for a growing
industry at about 40 per cent of net to its stockholders.
It is not true that this industry has enjoyed excessive profits, par-
ticularly if you look at its net income after taxes as a percentage of
operating revenues contrasted with the railroads, electric utilities and
even motor buses. The picture of air transport is a picture of instabil-
ity and low earnings. This is readily apparent when you compare the
basic nature of that instability of earnings of the five major airlines
with other regulated industries-20 railroads, the Greyhound Corpo-
ration, and 20 operating electric utilities. The electric utilities are in
the 15 per cent bracket which causes an investor, when he sees the
kind of coverage they have, the kind of margin or drop they could
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have and still be in the black, to appreciate the stability of that indus-
try. This stability enables them to go into capital markets and finance
their expansion at favorable rates.
Even the railroads and buslines are more stable than the airlines.
Figure 16 shows that airlines were the only ones in the red in 1947
and, in 1951, had a 71/2 per cent net income as a per cent of operating
revenues. In 1954, with the biggest boom in air traffic, they were below
the 5 per cent level. To the contrary, the railroads were at 7 per cent
and the buses substantially at the level of the airlines-both in con-
tracting phases of their business.
Another evidence of instability is the effect of passenger load factor
on the trunk line's net operating income. Load factor is a figure
employed to show the percentage of space profitably utilized against
space available-or the percentage of the product sold. As grosses
increase, the rise or fall of load factor has a greater and more unstable
effect on net income. In 1954 a 1 per cent change in load factor-in
either direction, up or down-would have meant a change of $14,000,-
000 in profits.
The air transportation industry is peculiarly susceptible to fluc-
tuations in traffic and even relatively minor fluctuations can have a
sharp effect on its earnings. In 1949 the first reasonably normal period
of airline operations since the end of World War II, the 16 domestic
trunkline carriers earned less than $14,000,000 after taxes and only
$20,600,000 before taxes. A change of 1 per cent in the average pas-
senger load factor of the trunkline carriers in 1949 would have
decreased the operating income before taxes of these carriers a total
of $6,400,000 for the year. A change of 3 per cent in the passenger
load factor would have wiped out trunk line profits in 1949. A 3
per cent change in load factor, in 1949, amounted to an average of less
than two passengers on a 57-passenger Constellation aircraft. This
would have meant, in effect, that a traffic decrease representing, for
the entire industry, the equivalent of less than two passengers per
Constellation schedule would have wiped out trunk line profits in 1949.
The industry, regarded as an entity and in the light of low and
unstable earnings, has not the hallmark of excessive profits tradition-
ally characteristic of monopoly or concentration.
UNRESTRICTED FREEDOM OF ENTRY WILL HURT, NOT HELP, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES DOMESTIC, INTERNATIONAL
AND TERRITORIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION
"Freedom of entry" is a term of some currency these days in argu-
ments about the role and policies of the Civil Aeronautics Board in
regulating the nation's airlines. Applicants for new routes frequently
claim that so-called "freedom of entry" should be a feature of the
airline industry, and complain incorrectly that the Board has followed
an ill-advised "closed door" policy of not certificating new domestic
trunk lines.
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But "freedom of entry" is only a catchword invented to advance
particular interests, who have no intention that it be given general
applicability. In other words, what the exponents of so-called "freedom
of entry" seek is just enough "freedom of entry" to get their own
coveted route awards, limited to the most lucrative traffic centers-
and then let the door close behind them.
The simple fact is that "freedom" does not mean "freedom" when
used by the "freedom of entry" advocates. No one seriously advocates
freedom of entry, in the sense the words would seem to imply: namely,
that anyone could start airline service over any route at will."
But if "freedom of entry" does not mean "freedom of entry," what
does it mean? Some of its spokesmen have used various qualifying
words to preserve the emotional appeal of "freedom of entry" while
not actually advocating it at all. They have used such terms as "regu-
lated freedom of entry," "greater freedom of entry," "reasonable
freedom of entry," "some freedom of entry," "some degree of freedom
of entry," "some limitation of freedom of entry," "considerable free-
dom of entry," and "not absolute freedom of entry."
In terms of specific routes, the qualified concept of "freedom of
entry" becomes even more restrictive. In terms of the "coast-to-coast
and New York-Chicago and New York-Miami" routes, the number of
carriers to be accorded "freedom of entry" would not be "15 or 20 or
30 ... or anything like that" but "a number much nearer three, maybe
four, or possibly even two."' 8 Thus, this application of "freedom of
entry" to the few principal traffic-producing routes would mean denial
of entry to 95 per cent or more of the 55 non-scheduled operators
holding letters of registration or exemptions.19
Those who have advanced the doctrine of unrestricted "freedom
of entry" are interested in one and only one phase of air transportation
-and that is the long-haul market to and between only the top cities
and the top traffic segments. A single most outstanding example has
been the application of a non-scheduled airline combine now partici-
pating in four pending route cases, whose application covers service
17 This is abundantly clear from the four months of hearings on S. 2647 (the
McCarran Bill), which proposed a complete revision of the Civil Aeronautics Act,
before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in 1954. When
the Committee's staff searched the records of the hearing, it found frequent illu-
sion to "freedom of entry" but could find no support for "complete abandonment
of the system of certificates of public convenience and necessity and return to a
system of free and unrestrained competition." Aviation Study for Senate Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Sen. Doc. No. 163, 83rd Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1955), p. 54.
Is Large Irregular Carriers Investigation, Docket No. 5132 et al., Testimony
of Robert R. Nathan, Transcript, p. 29002.
19 The Civil Aeronautics Board has exercised its exemption powers granted in
section 416 of the Civil Aeronautics Act to establish a category of air carriers
who operate without a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Some of
them are styled large irregular carriers and are authorized to engage in irregular
and non-scheduled air transportation by a letter of registration issued pursuant
to part 291 of the Board's Economic Regulation. Others hold special exemptions
granted by the Board authorizing irregular and non-scheduled transportation and
are known as irregular transport carriers.
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to 21 cities, every one of which is in the top 30 revenue-producing
cities in the United States. As indicated before, it is these strong
routes which support the operations of even the largest carriers to
smaller cities. But this is only part of the story. These sponsors of
so-called "freedom of entry," who seek favor from the Civil Aero-
nautics Board and sympathy from the Congress, have also kept away
from short-haul transportation of any kind. This reflects the economic
truth that even high-density short-haul routes have not been productive
of profit.
It is axiomatic, in transportation, that the greater the trip length,
the lower the cost to the carrier, and the greater its profit. The Civil
Aeronautics Board submitted statistics to show comparative trip
lengths for certain non-scheduled carriers as contrasted with the average
of the 13 trunks. In 1953 the trunks averaged 547 miles against the
irregulars 1667.
What this all boils down to is the fact that "freedom of entry" is
not the banner of any ideological crusade. It is not a realistic concept
for the airline industry. It is merely a catchword employed for the
age-old purpose of clothing personal aggrandizement in raiment of
broader appeal. The question of having, or not having, one more air
carrier on a given route should be decided on the merits of that route,
not on sentiment about "freedom of entry." Such a decision, on the
facts of each particular proposal, is by law the Board's job, and should
be handled by the Board exercising its judicial functions after full
hearing.
A most effective way to illustrate the specious nature of this
doctrine of "freedom of entry" is to imagine the situation which would
doubtless result if there were no regulatory limitation on entry. In
order to be equitably applied, it would have to be uniformly applied.
On the day that concept was introduced, every airline would tear
up its time tables, disregard its certificates, forget that it has franchise
responsibilities and do what business it pleased in the interest of
greater profits and not public convenience. Airlines who had filed
applications for particular routes would just start flying those routes
and not await Board action. Carriers who had sought for years to
eliminate restrictions would just fly over the cities to which they have
been restricted. The industry, in such a chaotic struggle for survival,
would then have to abandon service to roughly some 500 of the cities
to which it is now certificated, and operate only between the 50 most
profitable pairs of points.
Acceptance of the "freedom of entry" thesis expounded in pending
applications before the Civil Aeronautics Board, would be tantamount
to urging the creation of one or a number of new systems, draining
the rich juice of the air transport network from trunkline carriers who
would continue to be forced to serve thin segments. This would
create an extremely unfair and uneconomic competitive situation and
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dislocate the country's air transport network. It would not represent
any new or additional competitive opportunity, reflecting itself in
public good, but only a chance for a favored few really to enjoy exces-
sive profits.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this review of the Act and the progress of certifi-
cated air transportation was to readjust the perspective of the competi-
tive situation in air transportation today. It is necessary, always, to
recognize that the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 intended air trans-
portation to be regulated as a public service industry just like public
utilities.
The increase in airline traffic is not a reasonable measure of the
increase in airline profits. Busy telephones, stand-by counters, and
personal inconveniences are not the indices of economic health; cer-
tainly they are not evidences of monopoly or concentration. Beyond
that, they are not necessarily reasons for opening flood gates, the result
of which might well be to engulf our present airline economy, over-
expand competitive opportunity, unbalance systems carefully con-
structed, jeopardize future capital investment and the technological
development which flows from it, and result in service patterns which
reduce air service now provided to more people in more cities by more
airlines than was ever imagined.
In 1954 there were 59 certificated airlines, compared with the 22
which existed in 1938. These airlines have served well the objectives
of the Act of 1938 in creating an airline system which, today, is the
most efficient, most useful and most competitive in the world. It serves
our commerce, our postal system and our national defense. It is a
foundation of both our prosperity and our security.
